ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 85: Spies, not Soothsayers: Canadian Intelligence After 9/11

Reid Morden

Fall 2003
Unclassified

Commentary No. 85 has been archived.

Editors Note: Within Canada, intelligence is usually taken to mean security intelligence, which is designed to be preventive. Whether it is countering espionage, subversion, or terrorism, the structures, equipment and activities of intelligence organizations should reflect dispositions to meet an agreed threat. Author: Reid Morden is a former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Deputy Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and President and CEO of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. He is currently President, Reid Morden & Associates, which provides advice and comment on intelligence, security, and public policy issues.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

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Reid Morden is a former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Deputy Minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and President and CEO of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. He is currently President, Reid Morden & Associates, which provides advice and comment on intelligence, security, and public policy issues.

A Little History

Within Canada, intelligence is usually taken to mean security intelligence, which is designed to be preventive. Whether it is countering espionage, subversion, or terrorism, the structures, equipment and activities of intelligence organizations should reflect dispositions to meet an agreed threat.

"They're Spies, Not Soothsayers" blares the headline covering Professor Wesley Wark's "Comment" article in a 2003 issue of The Globe and Mail ⁽²⁾ on CSIS' involvement in the Air India tragedy. Unfortunately, most Canadians only are aware that this country is involved in intelligence activities when those activities become public and generally generate some controversy.

However, Canada is no stranger to intelligence activities. We have a long history in the intelligence business, especially security intelligence. This long history proceeds from a succession of threats, real and perceived, which the territory we now call Canada faced even before the country's creation in 1867.

For 120 years, there was an interlocking of Canada's security intelligence service with the federal police force. Only the establishment of the civilian Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the disbanding of the RCMP Security Service by an Act of Parliament in 1984 recognized the differences between security intelligence activities and law enforcement work, bringing this era to a close.

The evolution towards the Canadian Security Intelligence Service began when Sir John A. Macdonald created the Western Frontier Constabulary in 1864. This was to be a "...detective and preventive police force, for the purpose of watching and patrolling the whole frontier from Toronto to Sarnia." The Constabulary operated along the Upper Canada borders and rail lines, reporting on activities related first to the American Civil War, then to Fenians whose goal was to overthrow English rule in Ireland. The Montreal Water Police, a federal agency like the Constabulary, looked after Lower Canada.

In 1868, the government set up a 12-member Dominion Police force in charge of guarding public buildings and carrying out the previous responsibilities of the Western Frontier Constabulary. In 1920, the Dominion Police, then numbering 140, was amalgamated with the 2,500 members of the Royal North West Mounted Police to form the RCMP.

Between the wars, the security intelligence function, now within the body of the RCMP, remained small and inconspicuous. It grew as a result of the espionage activity related to the Second World War. The defection of Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko in September 1945 removed any thoughts the government might have had about reducing the security intelligence function to pre-war levels.

Gouzenko's revelations about number of elaborate Soviet espionage networks operating in Canada ushered in the modern era of Canadian security intelligence. His information showed that the Soviets of the day were interested in more than cultivating disaffected workers: they were intent on acquiring military, scientific and technological information by whatever means available to them. Thus, as the post-war period gave way to the Cold War, Canadian security intelligence operations grew in response to this new threat.

Espionage, however, soon became only one aspect of the complex world facing those involved in Canadian intelligence work. The 1960s provided challenges of an entirely different and unprecedented order. In Quebec, members of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) emerged and used assassination, kidnapping, bombing and other acts of terrorism in attempting to achieve their political goal.

This resort to violence may have tempted the government to use every means at its disposal, legal and extra-legal, to combat "Le Front de Libération du Québec". Those means centred on the RCMP and especially its super-secret Security Service, and on the blunt and intrusive War Measures Act. However, seen against the broader canvas of Canadian political institutions and mores, the government ultimately had to find a balance. In this case that balance meant the need to identify potential threats, but also scrupulously protect the right to exercise legitimate political dissent.

As a basis for action, the government had before it the findings of two Royal Commissions of Inquiry in the '60s and '70s, which had looked into the activities and alleged wrongdoing by the RCMP Security Service. Both Commissions had recommended that the security intelligence functions be separated from the RCMP and that a civilian service be formed to carry out those functions. Both commissions recognized that the problem of balancing the need for accurate and effective security intelligence with the need to respect democratic rights and freedoms could not be adequately resolved as long as security intelligence responsibilities remained part of the federal police force.

Leaving aside, for the moment, the essential philosophical difference between intelligence, which is anticipatory and preventive, and law enforcement, for which the final outcomes are arrest, prosecution and conviction, the government found the basis for its balance elsewhere. In essence it recognized that intelligence cannot effectively operate by applying the often restrictive norms of the criminal law. It must often probe much more deeply and sometimes intrusively if the security of Canada is to be adequately protected. These greater powers were to be balanced by a significantly higher level of third- party scrutiny (described below) than would have been feasible and appropriate for law enforcement.

The result was Bill C-9, passed in June 1984, and from which CSIS was created the following month.

As that decade wore on, the Cold War began to wind down and issues related to international terrorism became increasingly prominent. Although there is a popular sentiment that Canada is a "peaceable kingdom", in fact we are no strangers to the violence inherent in homeland strife and division in countries far from our borders.

The Emerging Threat

In the immediate post-World War II era, people hijacked aircraft in order to go somewhere, e.g. to Cuba or out of Eastern Europe. Later, in the 1970s, people hijacked aircraft as a means of getting other terrorists out of jail. Even later, in the 1980s and 1990s, the terrorist bombing of Korean Air Lines 858 and that of Pan Am 103 took place without any risk to life or limb of those responsible; they remained on the ground.

However, September 11, 2001 ushered in a new age of terrorism. The terrorists effectively demonstrated that every country in the world is vulnerable to attack. The message is clear. Whatever protection we felt we had, by virtue of North America being separated from offshore disputes by oceanic boundaries, it no longer offers comfort.

Terrorism and this radical brand of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism will be with us for a long time. These terrorist groups are fuelled by devotion, however misguided we deem it, to a cause. That cause has two objectives. First, the removal of all traces of Western society from Muslim countries. Second, the creation of a pan-Islamic set of fundamentalist regimes stretching from Morocco on the Atlantic through the Middle East and into central Asia. Implicitly, this latter development would "solve" the ongoing problems in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians.

Both objectives are pertinent in stressing why we must be concerned in Canada about the continuing nature of the threat. In terms of realpolitik, the West, led by the United States, is not going to abandon Israel and therefore those same Western countries are seen as legitimate targets by those who see in the creation of a Palestinian homeland the equivalent of the ultimate disappearance of the state of Israel.

On the economic front, energy has dictated much of the agenda throughout the Middle East and will continue to do so. In that context, the followers of Binladen and his allies see clearly the dependence of Western countries on energy supplies in the Middle East and make their own calculations. For Canada, which, at this point, exports more energy to the United States than the US receives from Saudi Arabia, it may not have escaped those planning economic attacks on the United States that Canadian energy production and distribution systems present a target of opportunity and vulnerability.

But let us take a look at the first objective, which is the removal of Western influences or a Western presence from Islamic countries. To many who hew to a very radical interpretation of Islam, rooting out these foreign influences from those countries is not enough.

Soon after 9/11, the Toronto Star published an extensive article on attitudes within mosques in the Greater Toronto area. There are 50 mosques in the GTA and the Star visited 15, and interviewed a number of Muslim students at York University. The messages received were mixed and in many cases disturbing. The article concludes that while a majority of mosques promote a moderate and inclusive message, a substantial minority preach the more radical message. This message calls, at one extreme, for the formation of one Muslim country with one unified army to, as one interviewee put it, "rid the world of infidels once and for all." ⁽³⁾

We should not be surprised. Terrorism and the violence associated with it are not new to Canada. We have seen Armenian extremists at work in the murder of a Turkish military attaché in Ottawa and in the death of a security guard at the Turkish Embassy there. We have seen supporters of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) smuggle detonators for use in the indiscriminate bombing which has wracked Northern Ireland for years. And of course we've seen it in the death of a baggage handler at Narita airport and of over three hundred deaths on Air India, both through the acts of Sikh extremists.

Thus, there are clearly substantial numbers here in Canada who are sympathetic to the radical message. That radical message can lead to many forms of expression, including the planning and perpetration of an attack on Canadian soil. The same can be said of many, if not all, the 50 terrorist groups that CSIS tells us have a presence on Canadian soil. In fact, CSIS reminds us in its Public Report:

The backdrop to the emerging and current terrorist threat is well-described by Professor Janice Stein in the "Network Wars", as "asymmetrical warfare" in the roll-out of terrorist actions. In a note of foreboding for Canada and others sharing similar values and institutional and societal structures, she describes where terrorist networks work most effectively.

How well that could describe Canadian society today!

As the next door neighbour and traditional close ally of the United States, the principal target of the terrorist's wrath, Canada must be prudent in protecting itself against the possibility that we may be attacked as a target of opportunity. No one really knows what form the next attack will take but most intelligence sources are agreed that it, or they, will come.

In Canada we must prepare against vulnerabilities of public buildings, heritage landmarks, symbolic structures, our transportation network, oil and gas wells and pipelines, community infrastructures, and, of course, our nuclear installations.

On September 11, we discovered that we did not have a working compendium of our "critical infrastructure". Thus, one of Ottawa's first tasks was to compile an inventory. The next step is to assess the vulnerability of these structures to attack. However, this step will require almost equally unprecedented cooperation and coordination at all three levels of government to provide the necessary protection. Progress is being made and productive relationships are being developed among those responsible for emergency planning in various levels of government. Given the often fractious nature of our federation-one can only hope that this is maintained. Unfortunately, the Senate report on airport security, issued on January 21, 2003 tells a sadder story of turf battles among various agencies at Pearson International Airport, Canada's busiest airport and a major continental gateway.

The Context

Legislative Framework

It is a commonplace to say that a country's institutions reflect its society and their values. One of such value in Canada is respect for the rule of law. It is probably also fair to say that when wrong is detected, governments, either on their own initiative or in response to public pressure, have probed the difficulty and generally taken actions to remove it or otherwise solve the problem. As noted above, the creation of CSIS was the result of one such set of actions.

Apart from the horror of the day itself, 9/11 was a watershed in Canada. It brought home to the government that Canada had significant gaps in its legislative framework to respond to the threats posed in an increasingly dangerous and ruthless world. Even its ability to freeze terrorist assets was contingent upon decisions by the UN Security Council as Canada had no stand-alone legal recourse to do so in the body of its legislation.

The government finally did deal with such issues as freezing terrorist finances and assessing the vulnerability of Canada's "critical infrastructure". It also carried out a review of existing and pending legislation to identify gaps in Canada's security Web. This review culminated in the introduction of new acts designed to update outmoded laws and fill in gaps not previously addressed in legislation. When added to the substantial strengthening of Canada's anti-money laundering legislation prior to 9/11, the result of legislative initiatives is to provide an effective basis for intelligence and security agencies to act.

Questions inevitably remain about the balance between protection/security of the state and its citizens, and preservation and observance of the latter's rights. Bill C - 36, in particular, has drawn the attention and criticism of a wide range of citizens. Essentially, many feel that the expanded powers given particularly to the police both abridge citizens' rights and leave substantial room for abuse of these expanded powers.

The question is not whether Canada needed additional legislative heft in its efforts to counteract terrorism. It did. The question is whether the hastily drafted legislation has accomplished its essential purposes without unacceptably moving the line of balance between legitimate advocacy, protest and dissent and the security of the state and its inhabitants, thereby unacceptably chilling unfettered exercise of the former.

The problem with the Anti-terrorism Act is both conceptual and specific. Conceptually, the new law diminishes due process protections as it seeks to introduce counter-terrorist measures, allegedly in conformity with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The specific problem with the Bill is the very definition that it introduces. The definition of "terrorism" is so wide that it could easily include behaviour that doesn't remotely resemble terrorism. Once the "terrorist" label is fastened on an individual, organization or suspect, then the rules of procedural justice are more easily suspended.

The Act also gives the Solicitor General the virtually unreviewable power to act on the advice of CSIS or the police in branding activities and organizations as "terrorist". It is no secret that the communities most vulnerable to being listed are those which are visibly identifiable as racial, ethnic or political minorities, recently arrived in Canada as immigrants and refugees. Yet these are the communities most dependent on their organizations for language and relocation services, as well as to that vital link to their homeland.

Much has also been made about the provisions in the Act for preventative arrest and investigative hearings. The Minister of Justice at the last minute tried to soften the extreme nature of these powers by providing a sunset clause under which the Bill would be reviewed after five years. In my view, the sunset clause is simply an excuse for intellectual and political laziness. Failing to come to grips with the fact that these provisions, in an unprecedented way, override fundamental freedoms of religion, expression and association which are at the core of section 2 of the Charter, will clearly trigger a Charter challenge. Whether the government's sunset clause is a compromise that meets the "demonstrably justifiable" test of the Charter is something that the courts will ultimately decide.

One must never forget that the existing criminal law in Canada already prohibits a broad range of terrorist activities, including agreements, attempts, assistance and counseling of crimes. But the Canadian government, in its race to catch up, went beyond the British and American legislation defining terrorist activities to include legal, political, religious and ideological protests that intentionally disrupt essential services. This definition then becomes the lynchpin for other new offences such as facilitating and instructing terrorist activities and participating in the activities of or harbouring those who commit terrorist activities. The overall effect is to lengthen the long reach of the criminal law in a manner that is complex, unclear and unrestrained.

Ultimately, many of the misgivings lawyers and civil libertarian have about the Act will be addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter. This is not a bad thing. The Court can, and I am confident will, act as an effective brake on the inherent excess contained in the law as drafted. This will not in any way diminish Canada's anti-terrorist efforts militarily or in terms of intelligence and policing measures, screening of entrants to Canada, border measures and air security.

Canada and the Wider World

If the overriding threat is terrorism, and terrorism transcends boundaries, then the ability of Canada's security and intelligence community to function effectively with its foreign partners has never been more important. The links with others have been forged over many years and are vitally needed now not just to ensure that the immediate tasks are carried out as effectively as possible, but to demonstrate again to others Canada's determination to counter terrorism and its professional capabilities to do so. For better or worse, it becomes a factor in Canada's overall relationships abroad at a time of political volatility in those very relationships.

Moreover, while intelligence work is undoubtedly best carried out in the shadows, an increasingly transparent world will make that tradition harder and harder to sustain. Instant communication, wider dissemination of data, both secret and open, and the need to reach out to non-traditional partners essentially define a new, and uncomfortable, working environment for intelligence and security practitioners.

In this new world, nothing is more important than our overall relationship with the United States. 9/11 and its aftermath brought us face to face with some stark realities, above all the implications of the steadily accelerating integration of the North American economy. Most dramatic was the shutdown of the border through which pass some 87% of Canada's exports, exports which fuel 40% of our economy.

A Canada that had become accustomed to an almost automatic exemption from punitive trade measures aimed at the rest of the world found that this was no longer the case; a Canada that assumed a special relationship and a sympathetic ear from succeeding US administrations found neither; and a Canada often free with gratuitous advice and criticism has found it prudent to select more carefully the issues on which it wishes to be actively at odds with the US.

In the intelligence and security community, nothing is more important than our ability to manage the border issue. In a world where perception is truth, many political voices have been raised in criticism in the United States, their influence bolstered by such high-profile cases as the chance arrest of Ahmed Ressam at the BC/Washington border just before the millennium turnover. While political and media criticisms may not be well-founded, they exist and are having an important impact on Americans, in and out of government.

Canada is not "a Club Med for terrorists", but there is a very serious job of rebuilding trust and confidence with the American administration, the American Congress and American public opinion.

The Smart Border Accord with the US has set in train new approaches designed to render the border secure for the innocent passage of people and goods. However, earlier neglect and budget cutbacks, particularly in the acquisition and utilization of technology, mean a long and expensive road ahead. For example, while the two countries are moving to joint inspection zones, only a minute percentage of sea cargo is now physically inspected and about 50% of the documentation-broker to broker-reveals neither the original shipper nor the ultimate recipient. At airports, while there has been some strengthening of security at check-in, almost all checked baggage goes aloft, checked neither physically nor electronically.

Depending on which statistics you use, somewhere between $ 1.4-1.7 billion worth of goods cross the border each day. That is an immense number. To give it a more human dimension, besides the biggest companies in both countries, this issue touches the vast majority of the one million small and medium-sized businesses across Canada - everything from truckers, importers, exporters and retailers to the agriculture, manufacturing, resource, service and tourism sectors.

Both governments have called for the border, customs immigration, transportation, law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies to continue enhancing their cooperation to ensure security at the border so that the massive flows of trade and people across that line can be sustained.

In 1940, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Franklin Roosevelt met in Ogdensburg, NY, to discuss the defence of North America. At that meeting, they agreed to mutual support in the event of an attack on either nation. So was born the principle of the joint defence of North America. The threat has changed, the imperatives have not.

Canada's Intelligence Community

The Canadian intelligence community has grown and evolved as needed-not always tidy-not always without controversy. Before 9/11, the Canadian security and intelligence community could be roughly divided into four groups: foreign intelligence, security intelligence, military intelligence, and criminal intelligence. Departments and agencies involved include the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), National Defence (DND), CSIS, Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the RCMP. In addition, agencies and departments such as the Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Justice and Transport Canada all have important roles to play. As well, other government departments have their responsibilities in the security aspects of public safety, such as Health Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Fisheries and Oceans, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the Financial Transactions Reporting and Analysis Centre (FINTRAC), the last created to ensure compliance with Canada's new, and tough, anti-money laundering legislation.

There was no single minister responsible for this community and departmental ministers were accountable for the organizations which reported to them. Ultimately the Prime Minister remains accountable for the security of the country but his involvement historically has been minimal. However, his department, the Privy Council Office, attempts to coordinate the activities of the security and intelligence community at the bureaucratic level. In a non-crisis-driven environment, before the pace of events began to accelerate exponentially, this probably worked reasonably well.

The Canadian intelligence community post-9/11 is structurally much the same as before, except buttressed with added powers and resources. Except for the creation of an ad hoc cabinet committee having overall responsibility for security matters, and chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, little has changed.

Into the 21^st Century- How Well-equipped?

While the terrorist threat concerned most of the world's intelligence organizations, Western intelligence organizations were both organized and resourced to focus on the threats posed by the espionage efforts so prominent during the roughly 40 years of the Cold War. When it ended, the intelligence communities in many allied/industrialized countries began looking for new mandates or targets.

Through the '90s, these services began to delve into such issues as organized crime, drugs, and economic and corporate intelligence. Success, or gaining a successful "market niche" was elusive, at least as far as the latter two sectors were concerned. However, investigations into organized crime and drugs were more fruitful, and although overlapping with law enforcement, easily meshed with the concentration on countering the growing terrorist threat. The latter phenomenon, culminating in 9/11, has brought about a reassertion of their original focus on the part of most intelligence services.

The preponderance of CSIS's resources had traditionally been devoted to counter-intelligence or counter-espionage activities, but that began to change with the winding down of the Cold War and the increasing seriousness of terrorist activity. The result was that by 9/11, CSIS counter-terrorism activities dominated its concerns.

The international nature of terrorism has raised questions as to whether countries active in the counter-terrorism arena need to conduct their own foreign intelligence operations. Here, unlike countries with which Canada traditionally most closely associates (e.g. US/UK/Australia), Canada has no offensive or foreign intelligence service. Does it need one?

In this writer's view, the answer is no. Moreover an attempt to create one will prove, in the end, to be a very expensive mistake. In the first place, Canada is already in the foreign intelligence collection business, primarily through the information-gathering activities abroad of DFAIT and DND, which of course includes the CSE. Secondly, those departments, plus CSIS and the RCMP, have extensive partnerships and contact points throughout the globe which collect essential data. Thirdly, the CSIS Act has great flexibility in permitting foreign collection and activities. Moreover, the combination of Canada's own resources plus its networks with allies and other international partners seem adequate in responding to terrorist threats to Canada, in particular, those emanating from Sunni Muslim extremism.

That said, it cannot be stressed too strongly or too often that foreign relationships, some non-traditional, are vital to countering terrorism. Just as important, these relationships must cut across all government institutions with an outward-looking face or mandate and their products utilized fully in a government-wide effort to combat terrorism.

As an aside, it is noticeable that in responding to crises there is often a propensity to solve apparent problems with bureaucratic devices. The creation of new committees and institutions are the most frequently used among these devices.

For example, following 9/11's failure by parts of the US intelligence community, the US has both established a new department of government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and within it, a new intelligence unit. What will be its real influence? What actual powers will it have? How will it relate to other members of the US intelligence community-an already crowded field of many, many players? Will it serve the White House better or simply become another bureaucratic way-station? The jury is out but the prognosis is equivocal.

Who's in Charge?

As can be seen from the large number of entities at the federal level involved in security and intelligence, coordination has been and will remain a challenge. In addition, political leadership or clout is needed to make structures of whatever kind work effectively. There is a need for integration and greater cooperation, versus the stand-alone "silos" which are the natural state of "competing" bureaucracies.

In current circumstances, and believing that Canada's necessary structures in the intelligence and security areas are unlikely to be significantly altered, the essential issues number three. At the political level in Canada, there has been little interest in utilizing intelligence as a regular tool to assist decision-making. This markedly contrasts with the uses to which intelligence is routinely put in countries such as the United Kingdom, with a much longer tradition of intelligence-gathering.

Secondly there is the associated question of intelligence coordination and the proximity that intelligence evaluations should have for policymakers. Traditionally, intelligence essentially represents information to which some degree of judgment or evaluation has been applied. Its value lies in the assessed reliability of the raw information on which has been rendered, a professional judgment free of political or policy bent or bias. Some argue that the time is ripe to bring policymakers closer to the intelligence process and to begin to include political judgments within the intelligence product.

This is a slippery slope which the United States is now discovering, as attention is drawn to apparent distortions relative to Iraq contained in the so-called intelligence product emanating from the special intelligence unit set up under the Bush administration within the U.S. Department of Defense. According to former Senator Bob Kerry, who served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, "It appears they have the intelligence. The problem is, they didn't like the conclusions" ⁽⁵⁾. Enquiries of a similar nature are going forward in the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the UK Parliament relating to possible manipulation of the intelligence product by the Prime Minister's political staff.

Thirdly, how can we ensure that timely intelligence evaluations are brought forward which reflect the inputs of the numerous departments and agencies listed earlier in this commentary? Although the PCO has done an adequate job in its coordinating role, it nevertheless remains too close to the political process. At the very least it is spread too thin and, generally speaking, prime ministers have had other priorities which drive the officials who serve them.

The times demand that arrangements, different from the status quo, for coordination and production be made to ensure that the intelligence and security system is functioning against the known and generally agreed upon threats to the security of the country and that its product comes from the information gathered and the expert judgments applied to that. Models abound. Britain's Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee is nominally head of the UK's intelligence structure. The United States has the post of Director of Central Intelligence which has often been held by the head of the CIA. Both models have their advocates and detractors.

This is not an easy question. It goes far beyond making a slight change in machinery of government accountabilities and, to be effective, must address the means by which a vast amount of data from human, mechanical and electronic sources can be managed, analyzed and utilized in a timely fashion. Furthermore, experience shows that imported structures do not necessarily thrive in different surroundings; hence, a home-grown solution. Perhaps a committee. If so, it must be headed by someone senior, knowledgeable, and respected throughout the intelligence and government world. Probably to remain within the PCO to stress the centrality of its work, but perhaps somewhat aside from it, with the head given unfettered access to the Prime Minister, other ministers, and the Clerk of the Privy Council.

Intelligence and Law Enforcement

Law enforcement is both a contributor and a big customer of intelligence. This very fact raises the issue of the degree to which there should be an overlap or, at the very least, closer institutional links between intelligence and law enforcement. In Canada this essentially starts with the RCMP and the CSIS. Relations between these two organizations have not always been cordial and much of the earlier interservice bad feeling has been made all too public of recent date during the Air India trial. Neither governments nor Canadian citizens will tolerate any continuation of these turf wars and apparent lack of trust and cooperation.

The essence of the problem rests with the difference between the objectives of intelligence, especially security intelligence, and law enforcement. Simply put, security intelligence equals prevention and law enforcement equals prosecution. The most proximate link, however, is the operations of organized crime which essentially cut across both criminal and terrorist activity. Organized crime is often defined as activities driven by the desire for financial gain while terrorism constitutes activities driven by political or social goals. Perhaps, but increasingly organized crime and terrorism are not far apart.

Many would argue that there is little to distinguish between terrorists and organized crime. Certainly there are many parallels, aims and objectives, lines of business, e.g. money-laundering, drug running. Certainly the groups often overlap and intersect. Given these interactions, there should be a concern about the presence of organized crime in our ports and, increasingly we are told, at our airports. If nothing else, this situation gives added importance and urgency to the need for seamless cooperation and intelligence exchanges among such agencies as CSIS, the RCMP, CCRA, Immigration, Airport and Port authorities and their supporting local police forces.

CSIS has recognized this link and has recently taken the unprecedented step of allowing its information to be used by the prosecution in a US District Court in North Carolina in a trial involving illegal activities related to the financing of equipment for Hizballah, a terrorist organization.⁽⁶⁾

Simply as a sidebar, one must note an additional dimension which may well hamper RCMP/CSIS cooperation: their differing public accountability systems. The creation of CSIS out of the ashes of the RCMP Security Service and its wrongdoings has meant that the intelligence service is subject to an almost unprecedented degree of oversight and review. It answers to its minister, to its minister's Inspector General, and to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which is supported by a well-funded and well-resourced staff. In contrast the RCMP has little or no oversight or review, with the exception of a responsive official, the RCMP Public Complaints Commissioner.

Challenges

9/11 has provided a common focus within the federal government. For once there is a common objective in protecting the country and its citizens. There is also an almost unparalleled need and opportunity to foster better cooperation and coordination with provinces and municipalities.

Canada's political leadership must be steadfast in understanding and communicating to the public that the threat is real and it is as real for Canada as it is for any other Western country. This is not the time for the country and its governments to go back to sleep. The danger is real. The adversary is ruthless and patient. We now have the dubious distinction of being included on lists of adversaries by both Binladen and Hizballah.

Canada's security and intelligence community must use the resources at its disposal to react to a threat, which unlike those of other days, is immediate and ruthless. A member of Britain's Security Service has described counterterrorism as not like playing chess against a single opponent, nor trying to solve a jigsaw puzzle, unless you accept that many pieces have transitory value or may not fit anywhere. Rather he believes it is more akin to tracing threads and weaving patterns. It is probably even more complicated than these essentially two-dimensional images. Think 3-D Tetris.

Canadian entities in the security and intelligence community must, at all costs, deepen and strengthen their internal cooperation, and their exterior links. Adequate funding to play a truly cooperative and effective role is a sine qua non.

Political and bureaucratic courage is needed to make necessary adjustments in Canada's security and intelligence structures.

Finally, to end as we began:

(1) Hon. Ron Atkey, 3rd International Law Conference, Canadian Bar Association, May, 2002, Ottawa

(2) Wesley Wark: The Globe and Mail, June 13, 2003, page A15

(3) San Grewal: The Toronto Star, December 2, 2001

(4) J. Gross Stein, "Network Wars" in R. J. Daniels, P. Macklem & K. Roach (eds.), The Security of Freedom, Essays on Canada'sAnti-Terrorism Bill, University of Toronto Press, 2001, p. 75;

(5) Seymour M. Hersh: The New Yorker, May 12, 2003; pp 44-51

(6) R.J.Conrad, Jr., US District Attorney, Western District of North Carolina, before the US Senate Judiciary Committee, November20, 2002

(7) Hon. Ron Atkey, 3rd International Law Conference, Canadian Bar Association, May, 2002, Ottawa

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