ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 5: De Klerk and "Law and Order" in South Africa

Commentary No. 5 has been archived.

Dr. Robert Henderson

August 1990
Unclassified

Editors Note: This issue of Commentary is devoted to the first of a three-part series on events in South Africa, by Dr. R. D'A. Henderson, a Strategic Expert in the Analysis and Production Branch (RAP) of CSIS.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary  series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

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Since his election to the post of South African State President last September, F.W. de Klerk has launched a surprising series of political initiatives aimed at a peaceful solution to the country's racial conflict. Yet his efforts to achieve a "negotiated settlement" continue to be retarded by violence initiated by both political and racial extremists. He is under increasing pressure to deal firmly with the question of "law and order" in the country.

During his recent tour of nine European countries, de Klerk was questioned in Brussels about the right- wing threat in South Africa (and reports that private armies were being formed). He replied:

This declaration is interesting for three reasons. First, it is explicitly non-racial by including all South Africans within its frame of reference. Next, it refers to breaking "the law", which includes the range of racial and security legislation passed by the white-dominated South African parliament. And finally, it offers no definition for the expression "law and order" in the South African context.

Defining "Law and Order"

In most Western countries, a "law and order" approach has come to mean a strong government commitment to law enforcement with broad powers given to domestic enforcement agencies. But civil rights critics of resultant policies perceive any government calls for "law and order" as simply a further reinforcement of the status quo or retrenchment of conservative values within their societies.

Within South Africa until recently, the use of the term "law and order" has generally meant the maintenance of white-minority rule and those government policies supporting racial segregation or apartheid.

Basically used interchangeably with the term "internal security", it referred in essence to insuring the security and prosperity of the white population in South Africa. But the primacy of that now orthodox view has changed over the past 18 months, due to the emergence within the National Party of a consensus that apartheid as a long-term means of preserving "white" (Afrikaaner) culture was a failure and that a "political deal" which could ensure white "security" in the future needed to be struck with the extra-parliamentary opposition, primarily the African National Congress (ANC).

References to "law and order" can now be seen in two ways:

1. a traditional general interpretation as adherence to the retention and maintenance of white rule and privilege, and
2. a new reformist narrow interpretation as the guarantee of white physical security during the period of transition brought on by the implementation of a new political dispensation.

The State of Emergency

The traditional general view of "law and order" was reflected in the implementation of the State of Emergency on 12 June 1986, following the gradual imposition of emergency regulations in a number of magisterial districts. The National Party government under P.W. Botha had declared the countrywide State of Emergency to control the escalating political unrest and violence, particularly in the African townships, but also to counter increasing right-wing criticisms-both within and outside the National Party-that while "status, security and living standards" were threatened.

These emergency regulations only marginally increased the broad range of security powers which the government security forces-including both the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF)-already deployed, including bypassing the courts in detaining people without trial, banning political organizations and activities, suspending newspapers and censoring public speech on existing legislation. The one important addition was that the "new" regulations indemnified the security forces against legal prosecution for their actions-particularly in view of the increasing number of deaths and the greater deployment of SADF troops to patrol the townships.

But such broad use of the government security forces can be traced back to Botha's period as Minister of Defence from 1966 until 1978, when he became National Party leader. In that position in March 1975, he had announced to the whites-only parliament that, since there was [perceived to be] a "total communist onslaught" against the Republic of South Africa, there was a need for a "total strategy", which became government policy when it was announced in the 1977 White Paper on Defence. Under this "Total National Strategy" approach, Botha as Defence Minister and subsequently as Prime Minister (later executive State President) sought to ensure that the "total" security of the South African state would not just be the SADF responsible for external security and the SAP responsible for internal security, but rather that all the various government departments and security forces would be closely co-ordinated.

To this end, Botha increasingly relied on the State Security Council (SSC), which came to be dominated by Botha-appointees from the SADF. Through its National Security Management System (NSMS) which paralleled the civil administration system, the SSC obtained an implementation capability to impose security-related policies approved by the State President. In effect, the South African government under Botha established a decision-making process which was not answerable to any constituency save the State President himself and ensured the efficacy of "a coercive maintenance" of law and order within the country. Though his government had proposed some limited political reforms, Botha subsequently "retreated"-in his defiant "Rubicon" speech in August 1985-from any implementation when he denounced the continuing disruptive activities of the country's "internal and external enemies".

When the government's emergency powers were renewed for a fourth year in June 1989, Botha was still the executive State President while de Klerk, though President-elect, held only the post of National Party leader. At the time of this renewal, the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Volk, who has Cabinet responsibility for the police forces, stated that the State of Emergency was necessary, as the "revolutionary climate" had not abated; his expectations were that political violence would escalate ahead of the forthcoming whites-only elections.

Prospects for negotiations in South Africa have repeatedly been declared to require "a climate of peace" to proceed and this means resolving the violent conflict(s) within the country. Such conflict resolution will continue to hinge to a significant extent on the perceptions and choices of President de Klerk himself.

Within this context, an analysis of de Klerk's perception of "law and order" could provide a major indicator as to his government's future decisions and policies in dealing with internal security in South Africa, particularly in the near term.

De Klerk's Perception of "Law and Order"

De Klerk's emphatic use of the term "law and order" at his Brussels news conference may have been chosen to provide the strongest direct rebuttal-for white South African listeners-to the harsh criticisms vented just prior by his predecessor as executive President. In an interview with the Afrikaans language newspaper, Rapport, former president P.W. Botha had declared that he disapproved of the course that the National Party was taking under de Klerk. And, not shying away from the use of the term "law and order", Botha went on to state that, while he "was and still is a reformer", he believed law and order must be upheld and security of the country maintained. Botha's criticisms can be seen as strongly reflective of the traditional interpretation of "law and order" in South Africa.

Previously, de Klerk avoided direct references to "law and order" in South Africa. Rather he used expressions like "violence" and "unrest" in the generic sense, especially when referring to the four-year-old countrywide State of Emergency, or alternatively talking about the need for "white security" in the sense of a basic government function. In his first major policy speech to the all-white House of Assembly in Cape Town, after his February 1989 election to National Party leadership replacing P.W. Botha, de Klerk stated that:

While pinpointing the security of the white population as the focus of his primary concern, de Klerk placed it in the context of the unviability of the "unjust" system of apartheid or white domination. In this, he made a distinction from his National Party predecessors, in that they perceived "law and order" as the maintenance of the status quo; i.e., the apartheid system. Yet his speech at that time went little further than earlier government calls for reform in South Africa. Under his immediate predecessor P.W. Botha, such "reformist" calls ultimately led only to a "militarization" of the National Party government's decision-making process and its internal security responses, and finally to the implementation of the repressive measures under the State of Emergency.

During the August/September 1989 campaign for the whites-only general election, de Klerk campaigned on the platform of a "negotiated political settlement" while "ensuring security", in accordance with the National party (NP) five-year "plan of action" which had been approved in June. He repeatedly declared that he would never negotiate with the ANC unless it renounced violence unilaterally. The white electorate renewed the NP government's mandate, but with a reduced though workable parliamentary majority. De Klerk-by adding together the votes cast for both his National Party (47%) and the anti- apartheid/pro-negotiations Democratic Party (25%)-could claim that 72% of the electorate supported his negotiated settlement approach, or as a "reformist" one when presented to the international news media in the West.

What was unstated but could equally have been claimed was that 75% of the electorate-combining the votes for both the National party (47%) and the pro-apartheid/pro-internal security Conservative Party (28%)-supported a continued strong, possibly even strengthened, policy of "law and order". Even the Democratic Party, despite its campaign platform calling for an end to apartheid policies and a start to political negotiations, supported more government funding for the country's police forces to counter the rising violence and crime in the country.

Though there was an obvious ambiguity implied by emphasizing his so-called mandate for "initiating reforms" while maintaining a silence on "ensuring security", it can possibly be explained as a deliberate political move on de Klerk's part. By publicly emphasizing the "initiating reforms" aspects, he could claim a mandate from the white electorate for such reforms as well as portray himself abroad as "reformist" South African leader. But he also had to ensure for his white electorate his continuing commitment to "internal security". This he subsequently did in his September presidential inauguration speech, when he declared that "in the next five years, the [South African] government would concentrate on five crucial areas, "one of which was that it would deal with terrorism, violence and unrest with a firm hand". This he has attempted to do by drawing the control of the government security forces more closely under Cabinet direction, eliminating the previously SADF-dominated National Security Management System, and instructing senior SAP commanders to concentrate on dealing with criminal rather political activities.

Then in his 2 February 1990 speech to the South African parliament, de Klerk announced that previously illegal political organizations would be unbanned, including the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), to "shape a new phase" with the emphasis moving away from "confrontation and violence" and toward "a debate of political and economic points of new as part of the process of negotiations".

In subsequent interviews, he further clarified this "new climate" in terms of "two parallels of development": (1) the continuation of an orderly government and the maintenance of order, and (2) "the need to create a new [political] dispensation". Although he pointedly stressed that these were decisions of the entire Cabinet, "a team effort", he acknowledged that "what went through my mind were the weighty matters and the certainty of having to end violence and get this country to bloom again" [emphasis added]; juxtaposed to which he pointed out that "mistakes were made in Rhodesia [Zimbabwe]. The opportunity for constructive negotiations existed, but is was not used". In his parliamentary address, he had also offered other motivating factors, such as the events in Eastern Europe, Soviet Union and china, the year of 1989 when "Stalinist communism expired", and the serious economic problems in Africa.

However, since that speech and the subsequent release from prison of Nelson Mandela on 11 February, it became increasingly apparent that there was a basic incompatibility between has declared "new political climate" and the continuing severe security measures in force under the State of Emergency.

On 7 June 1990, de Klerk announced an end to the government's emergency powers in three of the country's four provinces-but they would remain in effect in Natal. In his address to parliament, he stated:

He concluded his speech by pointing out that "the new South Africa must offer, in a just manner, participation and security for all its people". In his calls for security in South Africa for "all its people" is the implicit inclusion of the security of the whites-a further reflection of his perception of "law and order" as ensuring the physical security of the white population.

But the ANC response has been that the South African government "still has many of the same powers it had under the emergency decree" throughout the country and, as the State of Emergency has not been lifted in Natal, that "its continuation [there] exacerbates violence". Deputy ANC President, Nelson Mandela, went further when he stated that "the [SAP] police continue to kill our people and assault them in the course of peaceful demonstrations" and that " the [South African] government seems powerless to restrain them".

Implications for De Klerk's Future Policy Orientation

In a British ITV interview prior to his European tour, de Klerk declared that:

Within his reformist view of "law and order", it can be expected that the de Klerk government will pursue internal security policies which will remain within a basic set of parameters. These would be such that, on the one hand, the "government" would retain sufficient enforcement powers to ensure white security throughout the transition period and beyond, and that, on the other hand, these powers are not so oppressive-in either perception of human rights or implementation-that they become an obstacle to the negotiation process. But how will his view impact upon and engage the government security forces, including the intelligence services?

Based upon his relevant policy announcements since September 1989, de Klerk and his key Cabinet ministers have apparently adopted a program which places greater reliance upon "policing with a minimum use of force" against regional violence while being prepared to utilize SADF troops as a "show of force" if required. Such an approach also places greater importance on the use of the government's agencies for intelligence gathering and analysis to provide forewarning as to violence escalation and the intentions of extremists groupings. But this approach runs up against a twin obstruction:

1. the paradoxical ANC criticisms that the de Klerk government was unwilling to use its security forces to end the violence, particularly in Natal, while simultaneously condemning the South African Police as part of the source of violence against blacks; and
2. in order to use minimum force, the government has sought to rely even more heavily upon SAP units, yet it is daily losing SAP members (mostly whites) due to low morale and wages as well as rising operations risks.

While it is possible to set out the parameters within which de Klerk will fashion his government policies on "law and order"-a term which he has recently taken to using in almost all his statements on violence-any policy formulations are contingent upon two issues. First is the need to determine the various types of violence being perpetrated in relation to the South African situation, and second for a consideration of the instruments available to the government in controlling acts of violence within the country as well as those projected beyond its borders.

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